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WHEN Schiller turned to Kant, he hoped to find in the Kantian
philosophy an escape from the conflict between the principles of
art and his creative impulses, to which his early philosophic studies
had given rise, and to regain, as well, his inner life and artistic
spontaneity which they had destroyed. Exactly how he felt about
the matter can be seen from a letter to Korner, in which he sa}-s
:
"I am full of eagerness for some poetic task and particularly my
pen is itching to be at 'W'allenstein." Really it is only in art itself
that I feel my strength. In theorizing I have to plague myself all
the while about principles. There I am only a dilettante. Hut it
is precisely for the sake of artistic creation that I wish to philoso-
phize. Criticism must repair the damage it has done me. And it
has done me great damage indeed; for I miss in myself these many
years that boldness, that living fire, that was mine before I knew
a rule. Xow I see myself in the act of creating and fashioning; I
observe the play of inspiration, and m\' imagination works less
freely, since it is conscious of being watched. But if I once reach
the point where artistic procedure becomes natural, like education
for the well-nurtured man, then my fancy will get back its old free-
dom, and know no bounds but those of its own making." In short,
what he sought, and did find, was a poetical inodus vivendi between
natural impulse and artistic rule.
It was at the academy at Stuttgart that Schiller obtained, from
the "Institutes" of Ferguson, his first ideas on aesthetic philosophy.
For Ferguson, in whom there was no distinction between the moral
and aesthetic domain, all truth is beauty, "the most natural beauty
in the world being honesty and moral truth." Also, for him, perfec-
tion was made to depend on harmony and proportion ; moral beauty
upon the harmony of the individual soul wdth the general scheme
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of things ; while wrong action was equally looked upon as imperfec-
tion. And virtue, inclining toward the general harmon\-, meant,
necessarily, happiness. Such were the thoughts that defined Schil-
ler's early philosophic writings, as the letters of Julius and Raphael,
and the second book of The Ghostseer. But towards the end of his
first year at \\'eimar, a new field of exploration was opened to him.
Vov the author of The Gods of Greece and The Artists as one
of the essential factors in human perfectibility, had assumed such
vast proportions of importance that he felt it of the gravest con-
cern to understand it, this feeling, in fact, largely influencing him
to utilize the Danish pension to a th(3rough stud\' of the Kantian
aesthetics.
A course of lectures on the theor\- of traged\' was the initial
result of this interest in art, and though the\' were never published
their general import is contained in the two essays, "On the Rational
Basis of Pleasure in Tragic Themes," and "( )n the Tragic Art."
Tn the former, Schiller began b\' first contending that art has no
higher aim than the giving of pleasure, sa\ing that its aim is not
morality but "free pleasvn-e," by "free" meaning subject to no law
but its own. and that if morality becomes its final aim it ceases to
be "free." He then passed on to a discussion of the problem of our
experiencing pleasure in painful representations. To him, all plea-
sure descends from the ])erception of Zzwckiuliscii/keit (the qual-
ity of adaptability to the furtherance of an end) ; and as man meant
to be happ\', human suffering must be a "maladaption" which affects
pain. Since, howe\er, we are incited to activity by this pain, reason
recognizes in it a higher "adaptation" and therefore knowing it is
good for us we take pleasure in our own pain. From which he
arrived at the conclusion that the effect of tragedy is dependent
upon the proportion in which this higher sense of adaptation is
present.
The gist of this argument is that aesthetic judgments are con-
sidered to be dependent uj^on concepts of the mind, the reason, with
its various abstractions, being viewed as the prior and dominating
factor. Tn the other of the two essays we find, nevertheless, that
emotional excitement may give pleasure in and of itself; and
though numerous illustrations are given which indicate that Schiller
did not neglect the non-rational element in the pleasure afforded by
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traged}', \et he attached little importance to it for he claimed ihat
we are ac(|uainted with onl\- two sources of pleasure, the satisfac-
tion of the inclination for happiness and the fulhllment of moral
laws. After strug-j^lin^- with such hazy abstractions, he hnally at-
tempted a practical discussion of tragedy graduall\- coming to regard
its sole aim as being the excitation of "s\mpathy."
B\- the \'ear 1793. Schiller had become familiar whh aesthetic
speculations and moreover had found what he considered as a weak
point in the S}-stem of Kant, that if it were futile to try to establish
an objective criterion of beauty all aesthetic judgments must necess-
arilv be reduced to a matter of taste,—a most undesirable conclu-
sion. To Kant, the aesthetic faculty came imder the jurisdiction of
the ''judgment,'" a judgment, according to him. being teleologic if
implying a pre-existing notion to which the objectixe is expected to
conform, aesthetic if the object gixes rise directl\- to pleasure or
pain; in other words, though we have an interest in the good and
the agreeable, the beautiful is that which i)leases us without a[)])eal-
ing to an\- interest, llowexer. this is merely its character under the
categor\' of ([ualitw for under that of (|uantit\- it is uni\ersal •j)lea-
sure, while under that of relation it is a form of adaptation. And,
tinallv, under modalit}' it is "necessary" because of the sensus
communis of mankind, that is. it is determined rather l)\- their
agreement in taste than b\- an\" objective criterion.
Aesthetics, then, for Kant was a subjecti\e matter. To him,
it was not so much as what made objects beautiful, but rather as
to how we "judge" them to be beautiful: in short, the essence of
beauty was to please without reference to an\- intellectual conce])t
such as objective attributes of form, proportion, harmon_\-, etc. The
fault with this is that a judgment which has no connection with
the intellect is not a judgment but a feeling, but despite this he had,
at least, the merit of distincth' showing the necessit}- of distinguish-
ing more clearl_\- between the beautiful and the good and agreeable.
Furthermore, though insisting that beaut}' could not depend upon a
mental concept, he recognized "adaptation," notwithstanding its
being a concept of the mind, as a form of beauty, meeting this in-
consistency, however, by making a distinction between free beautx'
( pulchritudo vaga ) and adherent beauty (pulchritudo adhaerens).
And, lasth", though he held that the highest use of beaut\- is to
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symbolize moral truth, he claimed, at the same time, that pure beauty
was impossible in a moral action since it does not please in and of
itself.
With such a philosophy, Schiller could not be satisfied. In a
letter to the Prince of Augustenburg, dated the 9th of February,
1793, he clearly expressed his attitude by sa}ing in part: "When I
consider how closely our feeling for the beautiful and the great is
connected with the noblest part of our being, it is impossible for
me to regard this feeling as a mere subjective play of the emotional
faculty, capable of none but empirical rul'es. It seems to me that
beauty too. as well as truth and right, must rest upon eternal founda-
tions, and that the original laws of the reason must also be the laws
of taste. It is true that the circumstance of our feeling beauty and
not cognizing it seems to cut off all hoi)e of our finding a universal
law for it, because every judgment emanating from this source is a
judgment of experience. As a rule people accept an explanation of
beauty onlv becatise it harmonizes in particular cases with the ver-
dict of feeling, whereas, if there were really such a thing as the
cognition of beauty from principles, we should trust the verdict of
feeling because it coincides with our explanation of the beautiful.
Instead of testing and correcting our feelings b\' means of prin-
ciples, we test aesthetic principles by our feelings."
In a series of letters to Korner, Schiller now set about to solve
the problem which Kant had regarded as impossible of solution.
Although he agreed with the latter's view that beauty cannot depend
upon a mental concept,^—the feeling of pleasure is the prior fact,
he could not. at the same time, shake ofif the conviction that beauty
must in some way fall under the laws of reason. He escaped from
this difficulty, however, by removing the aesthetic faculty from the
jurisdiction of Kant's "judgment" and giving it to the "practical
reason." his argument being that the practical reason must have
freedom just as well as the "pure reason" rationality, for freedom
is the form instinctively applied by the practical reason upon the
presentation of an object, and is satisfied when, and only when, the
object is free and autonomous. Furthermore, practical reason, upon
the presentation of an object, can discard all concepts of the pure
reason and if then the object appears free, autonomous, it is satis-
fied, the effect thus produced is pleasurable and we call it beauty.
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HowcAei", as Schiller ])ointed out. it is all a c[uestion of appearance
for the object is not free as freedom is onl}- possible in the super-
sensual world, yet the practical reason imputes this freedom to it.
Hence he arrived to his solution that beaut\' is freedom in the
appearance ( Freheit in der Erscheinung ).
This doctrine Schiller applied, in a letter of February 23. 1793.
to an exposition of the relation between nature and art. According
to the theory, the problem of an artist is to convey, in the represen-
tation of the object, the suggestion of freedom, which he can only
do hv making it appear to follow its own law : and which it must
have and obey while seemingly free, this law ( the basis of our im-
pression of freedom ) being that revealed b}' technique. Following
Kant's saying that nature is beautiful when it looks like art. and
art beautiful when it looks like nature, Schiller employed a large
number of illustrations in support of his theory, tinally concluding
by saying: "Therefore the empire of taste is the empire of freedom :
the beautiful world of sense being the happiest symbol of what the
moral world should be, and e\ery beautiful object about me being
a happy citizen who calls out: He free like me."
Schiller was aware though that this criterion of beauty was after
all an idea of the reason, a difficulty which he promised to meet,
but unfortunate!}- his aesthetic correspondence with Korner was not
continued. In 'Sla.y and June of the same }ear, that is, 1793. he was
led to test his theory of beaut\- in the human form, in an essay on
Winsomeness and Dignity, by Kant's dictum that there is no pure
beauty to the human form because the human form expresses the
moral dignity of human nature which is but an idea of the reason.
As an illustration of his point, he made use of the girdle of A'enus,
sa_\ing that though \'enus was pure beauty on coming from the hand
of nature, her girdle made her "winsome;" winsomeness being then
something distinct from beauty, something transferable, movable;
defined as beaut}- of motion, as the element of beautv which is not
possessed by nature but which is produced b}' the object. Schiller
then went on to make a distinction between architectonic and tech-
nical beaut}-, the former being a beautiful presentation of the aims
of nature, while the latter refers onl}- to the aims themselves. And
it is the former with which the aesthetic facult}' is concerned, for
in the contemplation of an object it is alone affected b}- its appear-
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ance which it isolates irrespective of purpose or adaptation, though
at the same time freedom is imputed to it by the reason. In a word,
when the object is a human form this imputed freedom, by which
it appears to assert its own autonomous personahty, and which is
furthermore added to the beauty which nature creates by the law-
governed adaptation of means to an end, is winsomeness.
Fully satisfied that beauty consists of the two elements, sensuous
pleasure, and rational gratification, caused by personality, and the
adaptation to an end, Schiller next considered the questions of moral
beauty and ideal of character. Of Kant's insistence upon the cate-
gorical imperative of duty, he disapproved, for a man, he claimed,
above all else must be free, the slavery of duty being to him no
better than any other kind of slavery. Inclination to duty is, how-
ever, virtue, the ideal being found in a perfect state of balance
between the sensuous nature and the rational. And as winsome-
ness is the expression of a beautiful soul, so he defined "dignitx"
as the expression of a lofty mind,-—the expression of that intellec-
tual freedom which controls the impulses by moral strength, and
manifested in suffering ( jtdSoc ) as winsomeness in behavior
(yboq).
Following this essay, Schiller next published On the Siihlime,
in which was included a special chapter "On the Pathetic" and
"Scattered Reflections on \'arious Aesthetic Subjects." Two other
papers "On the Artistic Use of the Wilgar and the Low," and a
second disquisition "On the Sublime," though written during the
same period were not, however, published until 1801. Like Kant,
he defined the sublime as the impression produced by an object
which excites in man's sensuous nature a feeling of weakness and
dependence, and at the same time in his rational nature a feeling
of freedom and superiorit}'. He objected though to the former's
terminology, and proposed instead, for Kant's terms of the mathe-
matical and dynamic w'hich he had given to the two kinds of sub-
lime, the names of the theoretical and the practical, by the former
meaning that which tends to overawe the mind, by the latter that
which tends to overawe the feeling. But the most important phase
of the practical sublime is the subject of tragic pathos, and here
Schiller took the view that the final aim of art is the representation
of the supersensuous, declaring that the essence of tragic pathos is
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the representation of moral suiteriority under the strain of sufferinj^.
The spectacle of suffering" is in itself no end, for the sensuous has
inherently no aesthetic \alue : it is the moral resistance alone that is
of anv account, the suffering being needed only to prove the necess-
ity of resistance. In short, the hero's suff'erings must appear real
in order that he may receive proper credit for his moral trium])h.
In his discussions on the sublime and the pathetic, Schiller felt
at man}' times that he was on the point of being carried away into
the region of barren speculation, and to offset this tendency he
thought it necessar\- to j^-esent his ideas in a i)opular form as well
as to show their relation to the practical concerns of human life. It
was this thought that finally led him to undertake a series of letters
to the Prince of Augustenburg. declaring, in a letter of July 13.
1793, that the political dream of the century, of recreating society
upon a foundation of ])ure reason, had dissoK-ed into thin air for
"man" had failed to show himself fit for freedom. Though his
chains mights be removed, he was still a sla\e,—a slave to unrul\'
passion, despite what the centur\- had done for the enlightenment
of his mind: and what was needed was evidently rather a discipline
of the feelings. In 1795, Schiller published, in the Horcii. his "Let-
ters on Aesthetic Education" of which his letters to the Prince had
formed the basis, and which serve as the most agreeable expression
of his aesthetic ])hilosoph\-. The first ten were devoted to a discus-
sion of the spirit of the age and to demonstrate the necessity" of
some form of educational process by which mankind could be ])re-
pared for the higher state of freeman, the problem being, in a word,
the transformation of the state-ruled-by-force into a state-ruled-by-
reason. To attain this end it was necessar)' that man should first
learn how to o\ercome the despotism of sense, which leads to sav-
ager}-, and the supineness of mind, which leads to barbarism, the
savage, Schiller defining, as a man whose feelings control his prin-
ciples, and a barbarian as a man whose principles destro}' his feel-
ings. The man coinnie il faiit must not onl\- establish but preserve
a state of balance between his sensuous and rational natures. Put
how was this to be done? For neither the state nor philosoph\- could
help him as the former treated him as if he had no reason, the latter
as if he had no feelings. For the poet, his salvation lay, then, only
in the aesthetic sense, the love of beautv.
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To show how the aesthetic sense could accomphsh this Schiller
had recourse of two ultimate instincts or bents of mankind which
he called the "thing-bent" (Sachtrieb) and the "form-bent" (Form-
tricb), the problem of culture being to bring them into harmony.
As a means to this latter end, he then made use of the "play-bent"
or "Spieltrieb," his idea being that in the moment of aesthetic con-
templation both the sensuous and rational instincts find their reckon-
ing; that is. the act of escaping from the pull of thought and feeling
to a mental state which satisfies both without \ielding to either was
analogous to the act of playing, the word meaning, as he employed
it, a surrender to the illusion of art. Pla} being thus s\mbolic of
the highest self-realization, man becomes completely man only in
pla}'ing.
Schiller then went on to say that the natural corrective to the
emotional excess which leads to savagery is what he called like
Kant scJiuiclzcnde Schdnhcit (melting beauty) ; while the antidote
to the mental inertness which leads to barbarism is enerf/ische
Schojilie'it (energizing beauty, that is, the sublime), the aesthetic
state being recognized as being neutral as far as it concerns the
influencing of the will. Ikit it is because of this that it is valuable
moralK'. for when a man is under the exclusive domination of either
principles or feelings he is in danger of becoming a slave, and must
be redrawn to the neutral zone of freedom. "In a word." said
Schiller, "there is no other way of making the sensuous man rational
exce[)t b\- first making him aesthetic." The pith of all this is that
sanit\' and refinement being exigencies good art serves to realize
them and in so doing indirectly furthers progress in right living and
right thinking, a seemingly small result to have been obtained by so
much laborious logic-chopping, }et after all the value of the "Let-
ters" is not to be found in the logic-chopping nor in "the dreadful
arrav of first princijiles, the forest huge of terminology and defini-
tions where the panting intellect of weaker men wanders as in path-
less thickets and at length sinks powerless to the earch, oppressed
with fatigue and suft'ocated with scholastic miasma,"^ but rather in
their wealth of suggestive comment.
In conclusion, we have only to mention his later minor papers
as "On the Necessary Limits of the T.eautiful," in which he took
1 Carlyle's Life of Schiller.
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the view that the philosopher, aimini? at truth, should not try
to write beautifullv. for being- concerned rather with fact and logic
the lure of beauty ma> endanger truth by relaxing the mind, just as
it mav relax the will and endanger morality, this latter thought being
carried still further in his essays "On the Dangers of Aesthetic Cul-
ture" and "On the floral Benefit of Aesthetic Culture" which are,
however, merelv an extension of ideas contained in the "Letters."
